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WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT:
ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND
CLIENTS AND THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
Alberto Bernabe*
Courts and disciplinary agencies often have trouble defining exactly
how the authority to make decisions should be allocated between an
attorney and a client. In some cases, attorneys can make decisions without
consulting the client, while in others the decision is reserved for the client.
It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics without
consulting the client, while the client has the right to make decisions that
relate to the objectives of the representation. However, this distinction is
not always clear and has, at times, resulted in inconsistent holdings.
Even with that type of vague guideline, however, one would think that
a decision that can affect the constitutional rights of the client would be one
reserved for the client. Yet, that has not always been the case, and courts
have not developed a consistent approach to the issue. While some courts
have held that decisions that affect constitutional rights are for the client to
make, others have suggested there are different levels of rights, some of
which can be waived by attorneys without consulting the client. This
inconsistency is particularly problematic as it relates to the right to a public
trial.
Only a few courts have addressed the question of whether an attorney
can decide to waive a client's constitutional right to a public trial without
the client's consent, and most of their decisions are based on the notion that
attorneys have the authority to make tactical decisions. None of them,
however, has offered a convincing explanation as to why a tactical decision

. Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; B.A., Princeton University; J.D., University of
Puerto Rico School of Law; LL.M., Temple University School of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor Timothy O'Neill for his helpful comments on various drafts of this article.
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that affects a constitutional right should be considered to be a mere tactical
decision (which the attorney would have the authority to make without the
client's consent) as opposed to a decision that affects a fundamental right
(which the attorney could not make without the client's consent).
Two recent cases have addressed the question and brought the issue
back to the forefront. This essay explains the issue and addresses the need
to develop a consistent approach to the subject. It concludes that courts
should find that decisions that affect constitutional rights belong to the
client and that it would be improper for an attorney to make such decisions
without consultation.
THE LAWYER'S DUTIES AND THE ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY TO MAKE
DECISIONS

One of the most basic principles of the attorney-client relationship is
that attorneys owe fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties,
attorneys assume all the traditional duties that agents owe their principals'
and, thus, have an obligation to respect the client's autonomy to make
decisions, at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation. 2 Even
in those rare circumstances where attorneys are allowed to use their own
judgment to protect the interests of younger clients or clients with
diminished capacity, it is clear that the lawyer's conduct should be guided
more by respect toward the client's autonomy rather than by what the
lawyer may think may be better for the client.3 Thus, according to generally
accepted notions of professional responsibility, attorneys should follow the
client's instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the
client.
1.
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 67 (2009); see also RONALD
ROTUNDA & JOHN DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A STUDENT'S GUIDE, § 1.2-1.2(a),
at 107 (2012) (the lawyer is the agent of the client, who is the principal).
2.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note
1, § 1.2-1.2(a), at 104-05 (lawyer is the agent (not the guardian) of the client; lawyer must "abide by the
client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation").
3.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2012). On this point, the comment to Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14 states that "[i]n taking any protective action, the lawyer should be
guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best
interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent
feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14, cmt. [5] (2012). Thus, rules of professional conduct
demand that, other than in some rare circumstances, attorneys for minors and those with diminished
capacity abide by the same duties owed to an adult client. This is why in cases where lawyers are in
doubt as to the best way to proceed, the suggested course of action is not to make decisions for the
client but to ask for the appointment of a guardian other than the lawyers themselves.
4.
See, e.g., State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d 783, 786 (N.M. 2004) ("Although counsel may advise the
client on counsel's view of the client's best interests, counsel is ultimately required to advance the
client's expressed wishes."); see also Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The
Efficacy of the Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1959-60
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A second element of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client, which is
also clearly expressed in generally accepted rules of professional conduct,
is the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, which means to avoid situations
where attorneys face a substantial risk that their duty to a client might be
compromised.5 Based on this principle, lawyers have a duty to make sure
that neither the lawyers' own interests nor those of others "impede or
compromise fulfillment of the lawyer's duties to the client." 6 This is so
because allowing lawyers to operate under circumstances where there is a
substantial risk that they would be tempted to violate their duties to their
clients would damage the trust and confidence upon which the attorneyclient relationship must be based and would endanger the adequacy of the
representation.
Having said that, it is obvious that attorneys can't be expected to seek
permission from the client before making all decisions related to the
representation. After all, it is precisely because the client wants the lawyer
to conduct the representation that the client hired the lawyer in the first
place. Thus, the fact the client hired the lawyer, by itself, implies that the
client cedes some level of decision-making authority to the lawyer. This
view is also reflected in rules of professional conduct.7
With those general principles in mind, the drafters of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, upon which the rules of most jurisdictions
are based, and of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which is
frequently used in support of court decisions, have attempted to provide
some basic guidelines to help lawyers identify matters in which they need
to obtain client consent before making a decision. Unfortunately, the
guidelines are not entirely clear.
Absent a specific agreement between lawyer and client8 and subject to
the duty not to counsel or assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, 9
Model Rule 1.2(a) states that "[a] lawyer may take such action on behalf of
the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation," but
that the lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of the representation and "shall consult with the client as to the means by

(1996) ("lawyers may not normally substitute their own
representation").
5.
6.

opinions regarding the goals of

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012).
GILLERS, supra note 1, at 18.

7.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) ("[a] lawyer may take such action on
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation"); see also ROTUNDA &
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 112 ("notion that a lawyer is impliedly authorized to take action to
conduct the representation has always been assumed by lawyers and clients").
8.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) cmt. 3 (2012); see also RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21(1) (2000).
9.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2012).
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which they are to be pursued."10 Likewise, the Restatement states that
lawyers may take lawful measures within the scope of representation that
are reasonably calculated to advance a client's objectives as defined by the
client." Typically, courts and commentators have reduced this language to
mean that a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued.12
Unfortunately, these statements are not always helpful." As the
comment to the 1983 version of the Model Rules explains, sometimes it is
difficult to determine the distinction between objectives and means.14 For
this reason, both the Rules and the Restatement set some specific limits to
the lawyers' authority to make decisions for the client. For example, in a
civil case, a lawyer cannot take away from the client the right to decide
whether to settle a claim.' 5 Likewise, in a criminal case, the lawyer cannot
decide for the client whether to agree to a plea offer, whether the client will
testify in the client's own defense, and whether to waive a jury trial.' 6
These decisions are specifically reserved for the client.
Interpreting the meaning of the distinction between objectives and
means and the nature of the type of decisions specifically reserved for
clients, it has been argued that lawyers are entitled to make decisions in
matters that do not affect the merits of the case or substantially prejudice
the client's rights. 17 It is the client who has the right to make those types of
decisions. In contrast, decisions as to whether and how to conduct a cross
examination or voir dire or as to what trial motions to make and other
"strategic and tactical" decisions are understood to be for the lawyer to
make.'" One court has explained this general principle this way:

10.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).

11.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 20, 21(3) cmt. e (2000).
12.
GILLERS, supra note 1, at 72 ("A handy test is to say that a lawyer, by virtue of retention, has
the authority to choose the means for achieving the client's legal goal while the client has the right to
decide on what the goal will be."); see also WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 770-72

(Thomson/West ed., 3rd ed. 2007); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 106; MONROE
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 66 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. ed.,

3rd ed. 2004).
13.
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 801-02 (discussing examples of cases where a decision
as to "means" should belong to the client and why attempting to determine who has the authority to
make decisions based on distinction between means and ends does not always work).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt 1 (1983) (a clear distinction between
14.
objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 12, at 55
(that the distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn is an understatement).
15.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §22 (2000).
16.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).
17.
ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supranote 1, at 106-07.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2012) (authorizing lawyers to
18.
grant reasonable requests regarding court procedures, settings, continuances, waivers of procedural
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An attorney retained to represent a client in litigation is clothed
with certain authority by reason of that relationship. "The attorney
is authorized by virtue of his employment to bind the client in
procedural matters arising during the course of the action. ... 'In
retaining counsel for the prosecution or defense of a suit, the right
to do many acts in respect to the cause is embraced as ancillary, or
incidental to the general authority conferred, and among these is
included the authority to enter into stipulations and agreements in
all matters of procedure during the progress of the trial.
Stipulations thus made, so far as they are simply necessary or
incidental to the management of the suit, and which affect only the
procedure or remedy as distinguished from the cause of action
itself, and the essential rights of the client, are binding on the
client.' . . ."

The authority thus conferred upon an attorney is in part apparent
authority-i.e., the authority to do that which attorneys are
normally authorized to do in the course of litigation manifested by
the client's act of hiring an attorney-and in part actual authority
implied in law. Considerations of procedural efficiency require, for
example, that in the course of a trial there be but one captain per
ship. An attorney must be able to make such tactical decisions as
whether to call a particular witness, and the court and opposing
counsel must be able to rely upon the decisions he makes . . . In

such tactical matters, it may be said that the attorney's authority is
implied in law, as a necessary incident to the function he is
engaged to perform.

...

An attorney is not authorized, however, merely by virtue of his
retention in litigation, to "impair the client's substantial rights or
the cause of action itself." . . . For example, "the law is well settled
that an attorney must be specifically authorized to settle and
compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he
has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a
compromise settlement of pending litigation . . . . Similarly, an

attorney may not "stipulate to a matter which would eliminate an
essential defense .

. .

. He may not agree to the entry of a default

judgment. . . may not ... stipulate that only nominal damages may
be awarded . .. and he cannot agree to an increase in the amount of

formalities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of clients); see also ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standards 4-

5.2(b) (2004).

6
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. Likewise, an attorney is without

authority to waive findings so that no appeal can be made ....
...
Such decisions differ from the routine and tactical decisions which
have been called "procedural" both in the degree to which they
affect the client's interest, and in the degree to which they involve
matters of judgment which extend beyond technical competence so
that any client would be expected to share in the making of them.' 9
The distinction between tactical and substantive matters may be a bit
more helpful than the one between objectives and means, but it is still
problematic. Because waiving a constitutional right 20 might be part of a
tactical strategy, the question as to who has the authority to make the
decision should not be analyzed by asking whether the decision was
tactical. 2 1 The distinction between tactical and substantive decisions simply
does not help clarify the issue in this context.
Jones v. Barnes22 and Taylor v. Illinois, 23 two cases often cited to
illustrate the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the allocation of authority
to make decisions within the attorney-client relationship, can also be used
to illustrate this point. In Jones, a defendant sought a reversal of his
conviction because his appellate attorney refused to argue as part of the
appeal certain claims the defendant wanted to see argued.2 4 A divided
Supreme Court held, however, that the attorney had the authority to decide
not to argue the claims because this was part of the strategy for the
appeal.25
In Taylor, a defense attorney intentionally failed to disclose to the
prosecution the identity of an alibi witness in violation of a state law that
required it. 26 As a result, the trial judge did not allow the witness to
testify. 27 After he was convicted, the defendant appealed arguing that he
should not have suffered the consequences of the attorney's conduct
because he had not been a part of the decision not to disclose the identity of
19.
Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 650-51 (Cal. 1985).
A waiver of a right involves "[tihe intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or
20.
such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1580 (6th ed. 1990).
21.
There are instances where courts have characterized decisions involving, or that at least could
affect, a client's constitutional rights as "tactical." In Henry v, Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52
(1965), for example, the United States Supreme Court found that a criminal defense attorney's decision
not to object to the admission of certain evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was
part of a "strategic" trial plan.
22.
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
23.
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
24.

Jones, 463 U.S. at 745.

25.
26.
27.

Id.
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 400.
Id.
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stating:

The Supreme Court, however, held against the defendant

7

Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive
without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of
the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full authority to
manage the conduct of the trial. The adversary process could not
function effectively if every tactical decision required client
approval. . . . Putting to one side the exceptional cases in which

counsel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of
the lawyer's decision to forgo cross-examination, to decide not to
put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose the
identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial.29
In both cases, the Court's decision was based on the notion that an
attorney has the authority to make tactical decisions without the client's
express consent and that the client is bound by those decisions. However,
there are two other important aspects to the Court's position that are clearly
articulated in Taylor. First, the Court recognizes that there are some basic
rights that an attorney does not have the authority to waive. 3 0 Second, the
examples listed by the Court - cross-examination, calling of witnesses, and
trial strategy - again suggest that the rights that an attorney has the
authority to waive relate to procedural aspects of litigation and not to
constitutional rights. In fact, neither Jones nor Taylor involved a waiver
of a constitutional right.
Gonzalez v. United States32 provides another, and more recent, good
example. In this case, the Supreme Court held that an attorney had the
authority to decide, without consulting the client, whether to have a federal
magistrate preside over the jury selection process in a criminal trial.33 The
Court rejected the argument that the statute allowing this (based on the
consent of the parties) should be read to require the express consent of the
defendant. 34 According to the Court, the case law holding that some basic
trial choices are so important that an attorney must seek the client's consent
to waive the client's rights did not bear upon the decision involved in the
case because it was a tactical decision. 5

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 417-18.
Id.
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 400.
Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008).
Gonzalez, 533 U.S. at 242.
Id. at 247-48.
Id.
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Thus, like Jones and Taylor, the Court used the notion of "tactics" as a
way to delineate the limits of an attorney's authority to make decisions for
the client. More importantly, though, the case can also be distinguished
from a case involving a constitutional right. The Court's decision is based
on the notion that an attorney should have authority to manage tactical
decisions because the lawyer has the expertise necessary to make tactical
trial decisions, whether "of the moment" or as part of a larger strategic
plan. As the Court explained:
Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial, including the
objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to
advance, depend not only upon what is permissible under the rules
of evidence and procedure but also upon tactical considerations of
the moment and the larger strategic plan for the trial. These matters
can be difficult to explain to a layperson; and to require in all
instances that they be approved by the client could risk
compromising the efficiencies and fairness that the trial process is
designed to promote. In exercising professional judgment,
moreover, the attorney draws upon the expertise and experience
that members of the bar should bring to the trial process. In most
instances the attorney will have a better understanding of the
procedural choices than the client; or at least the law should so

assume.36
Again, as clearly articulated by the Court's language, the concern is on
the proceduralaspects of trial management: the need to make decisions in
the middle of trial, the need to avoid delays and interruptions, the
impracticality of having the attorney ask the client to consent to every
37
decision that needs to be made, and the need to preserve a fair process.
Thus, given the guidelines provided by rules of professional conduct,
the Restatement, and the decisions in Jones, Taylor and Gonzalez, one
would think that if a decision involves a fundamental right, it is the client
who has the right to make the final decision. Such is the nature of
decisions that affect the client's right to testify, to a jury trial, to appeal, to
accept a plea bargain or an offer to settle a claim, 38 and, you would assume,

Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
36.
Id. at 249 (giving the attorney control of trial management matters is a practical necessity);
37.
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418 (adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision
required client approval); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 800 (trial judge is hardly in a
position to continually satisfy himself that the defendant was fully informed as to, and in complete
accord with, his attorney's every action or inaction).
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 776, n.18 ("Although not themselves involving such
38.
decisions, Jones and Taylor together characterize" the decisions on behalf of a criminal defendant to
plead guilty or take action equivalent to pleading guilty, to waive the right to a jury trial, to waive the
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to waive a constitutional right, 3 9 because a valid waiver to a constitutional
right expressed by an attorney will be binding on the client. For this
reason, one would think that an attorney would not have the authority to
decide whether to waive the right without consulting the client. 40 Yet,
because neither the ends/means distinction nor the substantive/tactical
approach has been effective in helping courts solve the issue, doubts
remain and new problematic cases continue to arise.41

right to be present at trial, to testify, and to forego an appeal as '"fundamental decisions . . .' as to which
'the accused has the ultimate authority."').
39.
Townsend v. Superior Court, 543 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1975) (right to speedy trial).
40.
Comment d to Section 22 of the Restatement notes that delegation of certain decisions
regarding constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to a lawyer is not permitted. However, it does
seem to limit those to three circumstances: whether to plead guilty, whether to waive jury trials, and
whether to testify. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §22 cmt. d (2000);
see also ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 111 ("Lawyers do not always have the same

discretion to waive their client's constitutional rights as they have to waive some other rights.").
41.
A number of courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have held or suggested that an attorney
can exercise the final authority to decide, among other questions, whether to attempt to prevent the
prosecution from using unconstitutionally obtained evidence, whether to agree to having a federal
magistrate preside over jury selection, whether to seek dismissal of an indictment on the basis of racial
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury, whether the defendant should wear civilian clothes to a
trial, whether to seek to strike a jury instruction, whether to cross examine a witness, whether to use
peremptory challenges, whether to request or consent to a mistrial, whether to seek a continuance or
change of venue, and whether to seek relief due to prejudicial pre-trial publicity. However, courts have
been less clear on who has the authority to decide issues such as whether to accept ajury of less than
twelve individuals, whether to rely on a partial defense, whether to stipulate to the introduction of prior
recorded testimony on a critical issue, and whether to waive the right to a jury instruction on lesser
included offenses. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 779-83.
A different, and important, question that would have to be addressed in some cases is whether
waiving a client's constitutional right without the client's consent should support a reversal of a
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. That question will depend on the interpretation of
the type of decision at issue and the case law on ineffective assistance of counsel and is, unfortunately,
beyond the scope of this essay. As a general matter, if the decision in question falls within those that
clearly belong to the client, the attorney's conduct in failing to consult the client, or in making the
decision for the client, is more likely to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. That result,
however, is not inevitable. Even if an attorney takes away the defendant's right to make a decision that
should be for the client, the conviction will not necessarily be reversed. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
12, at 790-95, 804 (citing and discussing cases where failure to consult the client on decisions that
belonged to the client was not found to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Also, even if the
attorney's conduct is, in fact, considered ineffective assistance of counsel, the courts will not reverse a
conviction unless the defendant can meet the standard set in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), which requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability that but for the
attorney's conduct the verdict may have been different. This has been called a "prosecution-friendly"
standard, as opposed to the more defendant-friendly standard used in cases in which the defendant
alleges it was the prosecutor who violated the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights. See
Timothy O'Neill, Gideon's 50th anniversary deserves only two cheers, THE CHICAGO DAILY LAW

BULLETIN (August 14, 2013), available at http://news.jmls.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ONeillAug.-14.pdf. A recently decided case in the District of Columbia illustrates the point. In Littlejohn v.
United States, No. II -CO-820 (D.C. August 29, 2013), the court of appeals held that the defendant's
attorney had validly waived the defendant's right to challenge the exclusion of certain members of the
public from his trial. However, it also held that the defendant had not waived his claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court's closure order. Id. And, in order to decide
whether the defendant could support his argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court used
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ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States grants
criminal defendants the right to a public trial, and the United States
Supreme Court has consistently held that the trial includes the jury
selection process.42 In fact, the right to a public trial is so fundamental to
our system of justice that it is guaranteed to the defendant, the general
public, and the press.43 This is so because, as the Court has stated, the right
to an open court in criminal proceedings is an effective restraint on possible
abuse -of judicial power." The Court has also explained that conducting
jury selection in open court permits members of the public to observe trial
proceedings, promotes fairness in the judicial system,4 5 encourages
witnesses to come forward, and discourages pejury.46 However, the right
to a public trial is not absolute and, like most other constitutional rights, it
can be waived.4 7
The fact that the right can be waived, however, does not explain how it
must be waived for the waiver to be valid. While recognizing that a
defendant's attorney is best equipped to make choices affecting conduct of
the trial and relating to trial tactics, the Supreme Court has noted that for
certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an
informed waiver.4 8 Unfortunately, because tactical decisions often can
affect fundamental rights, courts have had a difficult time separating these
two principles.
As stated above, only a few courts have addressed the question of
whether an attorney can decide to waive a client's constitutional right to a
public trial without the client's consent. Courts that have held that an
attorney can waive the client's right without the client's consent tend
simply to repeat the notion that a defendant's counsel has the authority to
the analysis developed in Strickland, although the court did conclude that the defendant would not have
to show the element of prejudice usually required by the Strickland analysis. Id.
42.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI;
Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
43.
Presley, 558 U.S. at 213 (the right to a public trial is protected by the First and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (right to
public trial functions for the benefit of the accused and the public); Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at
508 (conducting jury selection in open court permits members of the public to observe trial proceedings
and promotes fairness in the judicial system); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
44.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270; Kleinbart v. United States, 388 A.2d 878, 881 (D.C. 1978) (right
to a public trial has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ the courts as
instruments of persecution).
45.
Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 508.
46.
Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
47.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (a judge may permit
closure of a court room if the closure satisfies the necessary requirements).
48.
For a discussion of the relevant cases, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § I1.6(a), at 770-88.
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make tactical decisions without the need for the client's consent, while
courts that have held the opposite simply assert that an attorney does not
have the authority to decide matters that affect a fundamental right without
the client's consent.
In Williams v. State,4 9 for example, the trial court excluded a criminal
defendant's family from the courtroom during voir dire over the
defendant's objection. After the defendant was convicted, the court of
appeals held that the trial court's exclusion from the courtroom during voir
dire of all members of the public, including Williams' family members,
required reversal of the conviction.50 It also held that Williams could not
have been found to have waived his right to a public trial because, while
fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to a public trial can be
waived, "[a]n effective waiver of a constitutional right must be voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent. "
Thus, for the court, the key question was
whether the decision to waive a right affected a fundamental right. 52 Given
that it did, the decision belonged to the client.5 3
Likewise, in Martineau v. Perrin,54 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
held that although a criminal defendant can waive the constitutional right to
a public trial, the waiver must be intentional and knowing. The court did
not elaborate on its conclusion beyond stating that it agreed with the
petitioner that, since a constitutional right was involved, there had to be an
intentional and knowing waiver.5 6 In other words, for this court, the key
was whether the right affected was not "fundamental" but "constitutional."
In contrast, other courts have held that an attorney can waive the right
to a public trial without consulting the client. For example, without much
explanation, two years after it had decided Williams v. State, the same court
concluded in Berkuta v. State of Florida that Williams did not require that
the right to a public trial, "like other fundamental rights such as the right to
counsel and the right to a jury trial, be waived expressly and personally by
the defendant on the record."57 Thus, somehow the court decided there are
some fundamental rights that are more fundamental than others.

49.
Williams v. State, 736 So. 2d 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
50.
Williams, 736 So. 2d at 703-04.
51.
Id. at 704 (citing Tucker v. State, 559 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1990)).
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
54.
Martineau v. Perrin, 601 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1979).
55.
Martineau,601 F.2d at 1200.
56.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 237 (1973); United States v. Christian, 571 F.2d 64, 68-69 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
Lespier, 558 F.2d 624, 629-30 (1st Cir. 1977); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1976).
57.
Berkuta v. State of Florida, 788 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
58.
Id. at l081.
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Other courts have decided the issue using similar language, 5 9 but the
Supreme Court of Utah offered the best explanation in support of the view
that an attorney has the authority to waive a client's constitutional right to a
public trial without the client's consent in State v. Butterfield.o In that
case, the trial court granted the State's motion to close a trial to the public
based on the fact that the case involved a sexual crime and a fourteen-yearold victim. 6 ' The defendant's attorney did not inform his client of the
request to close the proceedings and did not object to the motion, which
was discussed in private by the prosecutor, the defendant's lawyer, and the
62
judge. Later, the motion was made in open court and neither the
defendant nor his lawyer objected. 63 On appeal after his conviction, the
defendant argued that his right to a public trial had been violated because,
although his counsel did not object to the closure, a defendant must
personally waive the right to a public trial.4
The Utah Supreme Court, however, held that the failure of a defendant
and counsel to object to a closure order constituted a waiver of the
defendant's right to a public trial. 65 Although this statement-and the facts
of the case-did not mention the issue of whether the attorney could waive
the right without the client's consent, the court's reasoning would support
that conclusion because, in the end, the decision was based on a value
judgment of the nature of the right to a public trial.66 The court found that,
although protected by the state and federal constitutions, the right was not
as important as other rights:
It is helpful to compare other rights that have been held to
require a personal waiver by the defendant. Among these are the
right to trial, which is waived by a plea . . . ; the right to be present
at trial . . . ; the right to trial by jury . . . ; and the right to an
interpreter at trial . . . . A unifying characteristic of these rights

appears to be that they are of central importance to the quality of
the guilt-determining process and the defendant's ability to
participate in that process.

59.
See People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 570 (Cal. 1997) (no personal waiver by defendant is
expressly required to waive the right to a public criminal trial under the California Constitution); People
v. Vaughn, 821 N.W.2d 288, 297 (Mich. 2012) (right to public trial during jury selection is not within
limited class of constitutional rights that require a waiver to be personal and knowing).
60.
United States v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153 (Utah 1989).
61.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 153.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
Id.
64.
65.
Id.
66.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156.
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We judge the right to a public trial to be of a different order.
Certainly it is important in assuring that abuses by the state are not
permitted to be hidden from public view.

. .

. On the other hand, the

absence of the public in a particular case does not necessarily affect
qualitatively the guilt-determining process or the defendant's
ability to participate in the process.

. .

. Of course, it is possible that

in a particular case the wrongful closure of a trial could have an
adverse impact. . . . However, the mere possibility of such an

instance does not seem to warrant the imposition of a requirement
of a personal waiver of the right to a public trial in all cases. Such
possibilities are better dealt with via an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. 6 7
The most recent decision on the subject also follows this type of
reasoning. In Commonwealth v. Lavoie,68 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts was asked to consider whether a Superior Court judge
properly denied a criminal defendant's motion for a new trial in which he
claimed that his right to a public trial had been violated when his counsel
failed to object to the exclusion of the public, including his family
members, from the courtroom during jury selection. 69 The trial judge
denied the defendant's motion, but the appeals court reversed, concluding
that the defendant's right to a public trial had been violated.70 On appeal,
the state supreme court reversed, holding that counsel may waive a
defendant's right to a public trial during jury selection without his client's
express consent because that is a tactical decision. 7 1 This conclusion,
therefore, introduces a third element to the analysis: whether the decision is
tactical as opposed to whether the decision relates to a constitutional right
or a fundamental right.
THE ANALYSIS USED FOR ALLOCATING THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE
DECISIONS

It has been said that "[a] lawyer's reliance on the ends/means
distinction to assume authority to make decisions without client
consultation, even if technically correct so far as the ethics rules and
agency law are concerned, can make for bad client relations."72 It can also
make for bad law.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 156.
Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 981 N.E.2d 192 (Mass. 2013).
Lavoie, 981 N.E.2d at 194.
Id.
Id.

72.

GILLERS, supra note 1, at 73.
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As one would expect, the issue is straightforward when a case involves
one of the rights or decisions enumerated in the Rules of Professional
Conduct or the Restatement.73 The problems arise when the cases involve
other types of rights, and courts are left to decide the claims using the
vague guidelines based on terms like ends, means, tactics, or substance.
For example, the court's reasoning in State v. Butterfield illustrates the
problems in trying to decide the cases based on distinctions among
different levels of constitutional rights. Likewise, the decision in
Commonwealth v. Lavoie illustrates the inadequacy of attempting to use a
tactics/means distinction to determine if the attorney's conduct violated his
duty to the client.
In Butterfield, the court avoided the unworkable tactics/substance
distinction in favor of one based on an evaluation of the importance of the
decision, which is a good thing. However, it then decided that there are
some constitutional rights that apparently deserve more protection than
others. That is a bad thing.
What the court did in fact was compare those types of rights the
decisions about which have been determined to be for the client to make
with the decision to waive the right to a public trial, regardless of the fact
that this is a constitutional right.7 4 This, in essence, is based on the
distinction that some courts have made between a mere constitutional right
and a fundamental constitutional right, which the court defined as one that
is "of central importance to the quality of the guilt-determining process and
the defendant's ability to participate in that process."
According to the court, while the right to accept a plea agreement, the
right to decide whether to plead guilty, the right to a trial by jury, and the
right to have an interpreter meet this requirement, the right to a public trial
does not.76 This approach was recently adopted by the Supreme Court of
Michigan when, citing Butterfield, it held:
While certain constitutional rights are preserved absent a personal
waiver, those rights constitute a narrow class of foundational
constitutional rights that "are of central importance to the quality of
the guilt-determining process and the defendant's ability to
participate in that process." Indeed, each of the foundational
constitutional rights that are preserved absent a personal waiver
necessarily implicates a defendant's other constitutional rights.
For example, the purpose of the right to counsel "would be
nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant failure to
73.
74.
75.
76.

See supra note 41.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156.
Id. at 156.
Id.
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claim his rights removes the protection of the Constitution"
because it is counsel's responsibility to "protect an accused from
conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and
constitutional rights. . . ." Because the right to counsel "invokes, of

itself, the protection of a trial court," preservation of the right does
not require an affirmative invocation. Similarly, a waiver of the
right to plead not guilty "would shut off the defendant's
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him which he would have an opportunity to do under a plea
of not guilty." The right to a public trial is "of a different order"
because the violation of that right "does not necessarily affect
qualitatively the guilt-determining process or the defendant's
,,77
ability to participate in the process.
The problem with the reasoning in these cases is that it fails to
recognize the value of the right to a public trial, as discussed by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions on public trials, and the defense counsel's
professional responsibility duties to a client. Taking those into account, the
argument upon which the courts' analysis is based is less convincing.
These courts' analyses are based on whether the right at issue is "of
central importance to the quality of the guilt-determining process."7 8 There
should be no question that the right to a public trial meets this element.
The right to a public trial has its roots in our English common law
heritage, and the Supreme Court has held that inherent in this heritage is
the presumption of openness of judicial proceedings.80 Also, as the Court
has explained, "[t]he Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the
long history of trials being presumptively open," 8' and openness was
regarded as an important aspect of the process itself.8 2 According to the
Court, "public access to criminal trials and the selection of jurors is
essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system"83
because, as Justice Brennan explained in a concurring opinion, "[p]ublicity
serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial (and,
indeed, the judicial) process."84 His view, which the Court later adopted,85
was that "[o]pen trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
fairness

Vaughn, 821 N.W.2d at 297-98.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156.
For a discussion of this history, see Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
Id. at 575.
Id. See supratext accompanying notes 42 through 46.
Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (ll), 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Press Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 508 (openness creates confidence that standards of
are being observed and enhances basic fairness of criminal trials).
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our judicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate
adjudication of guilt or innocence." 8 6 In other words, unlike what the
supreme courts of Utah and Michigan held in Butterfield and Vaughn, the
view of the U.S. Supreme Court is that the right to a public trial is "of
central importance to the quality of the guilt-determining process."8 7
addition, a number of courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have
specifically emphasized the importance of openness to a defendant's family
members.
Also, if the Michigan Supreme Court is correct when it states in
Vaughn that it is counsel's responsibility to "protect an accused from
conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional
rights,"" then one must ask what is the proper way for an attorney to meet
that responsibility. Because that responsibility must be met by making
important decisions that affect the client's constitutional rights, as
discussed above, it would not be proper for the attorney to make decisions
about matters that affect the client's rights without consultation. Doing so
would be inconsistent with duties included in rules of professional
responsibility and would nullify the role of counsel, which is what the court
in Butterfield claims to be worried about. In other words, the best way to
"protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of
his legal and constitutional rights" 90 would be to do the opposite of what
the courts in Butterfield and Vaughn suggest: to explain those rights to the
client and allow the client to determine whether it would be best to waive
them. Simply stated, the basis for the decision in Butterfield and similar
cases actually points to the conclusion that the decision to waive a
constitutional right should belong to the client.
Attempting to avoid this last problem (taking a position inconsistent
with principles of professional responsibility), in Commonwealth v.
Lavoie,91 the court's conclusion that an attorney can waive a defendant's
constitutional right without the client's consent is based on the mere
assertion that waiving the client's constitutional right to a public trial was a
tactical decision. This way the court can conclude that the attorney's

86.
For this reason, although the right to a public trial is not absolute, "it is only under the most
exceptional circumstances that limited portions of a criminal trial may be closed even partially to the
public." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 593. See also Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 873
(D.C. 2005); Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (the circumstances under which the right to an open trial may give
way will be rare and the balance of interests must be struck with special care).
87.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156.
88.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272 ("[A]n accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends,
relatives and counsel [present at trial]."); Littlejohn, No. I I-CO-820 (D.C., August 29, 2013) (citing
Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 873) (presence of family and friends at trial is particularly important).
89.
Vaughn, 821 N.W.2d at 298 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 304 U.S. 461, 465 (1997)).
90.
Id.
91.
Lavoie, 981 N.E.2d 192.
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responsibility to protect the client's interests is not affected because his
conduct was within his authority to act for the client. The problem with
this approach to the issue, however, is that it is based on a flawed
interpretation that ultimately contradicts the fundamental basis of the
allocation of authority within the attorney-client relationship and may result
in a conflict of interests.
In Lavoie, when the jury selection for the defendant's trial began, court
officers excluded his family from the courtroom. 9 2 The defendant's
attorney did not object.93 After his conviction, the defendant moved for a
new trial, arguing that his right to a public trial under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution was violated
when the court officers closed the courtroom to the public during the voir
dire.94 The judge, who had not been aware that the officers had excluded
the defendant's family, conducted an evidentiary hearing during which the
defendant's lawyer testified that "it was not his usual practice to object
when court officers cleared the court for jury selection because he was
aware that space was often insufficient, and he did not want to interfere
with court officers who he perceived engaged in a difficult job."95 The
attorney also explained that he thought the defendant's family members
"could present a distraction."96
After the hearing, the judge concluded that the two-day closure of the
courtroom violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, but denied the
motion for a new trial because, among other things, "defense counsel's
failure to object to the closure was a reasonable tactical decision."97 On
appeal from the judge's ruling, a divided appeals court reversed,
concluding that the defendant's right to a public trial had been violated. 98
Subsequently, on appeal from that ruling, although it agreed that the
defendant's constitutional right had been violated, the state supreme court
reversed.
The defendant's argument was simply that he had not waived his right
to a public trial because it was improper for his attorney to waive his
constitutional rights without ever discussing the issue with him.99 The
court, however, concluded that counsel may waive, with or without the
defendant's express consent, the right to a public trial during jury selection

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Lavoie, 981 N.E.2d at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
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"where the waiver is a tactical decision as part of counsel's trial
strategy."' 00
The court offered no explanation to support its conclusion that a
tactical decision that affects a constitutional right should be considered to
be a mere tactical decision (which the attorney would have the authority to
make without the client's consent) as opposed to a decision that affects a
fundamental right (which the attorney could not make without the client's
consent).' 0' The court simply repeated the conclusion that the defendant
counsel's waiver of the defendant's right to a public trial during jury
selection was a tactical decision, which is in defense counsel's purview to
manage the conduct of the trial.102
Nor did the court explain exactly why the decision was, in fact, tactical.
The attorney gave several different reasons for his decision not to object to
the closed proceeding, and the only one that sounded tactical was that the
family members could present a distraction.10 3 The other reasons were the
attorney's own personal or professional interest in not interfering with the
court personnel.104 Yet, the court did not consider the possibility that
allowing the attorney to use his own interests as a deciding factor to waive
a client's constitutional right might constitute a conflict of interest.
The court clearly recognized that the decision in the case depended on
an understanding of the allocation of authority to make decisions within the
attorney-client relationship, and it understood the basic principles related to
the allocation of authority. The court explained that an attorney is best
equipped to make choices affecting conduct of the trial, including the
objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance
because they depend upon "tactical considerations."' 05 But, as the court
explained, in order to preserve the basic rights of the accused, when it
comes to fundamental rights, it is the defendant who has the right to decide
to waive the defendant's rights.' 06 The court also understood that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a public trial, which
includes the jury selection process and that in this case that right was, in
fact, violated.'07 Yet, even after finding that the defendant's constitutional
right had been violated, the court was satisfied with concluding that an

100.
101.

Id. at 198.
Lavoie, 981 N.E.2d at 192.

102.

Id.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 196-99.
Lavoie, 981 N.E.2d at 192.

107.

Id.
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attorney could make the decision to waive a client's constitutional right
without consulting the client.108
Like in so many other cases, the court's decision was based on the
claim that the attorney's decision was tactical. The problem with this type
of reasoning, however, is that an attorney can always claim a decision was
tactical. 109 Isn't it a tactical decision to decide whether to plead guilty to
avoid a trial, or whether to waive the right to a jury trial, or whether a
defendant should testify? If so, then the attorney should be able to decide
without consulting the client on how to plead for the client, whether to
waive a jury trial, or whether the defendant should testify." 0 Yet, we know
the attorney cannot do that. These are all tactical decisions, but the
attorney cannot make the decision without consulting the client. What we
can't seem to be able to explain is why.'
This is why basing the analysis on whether the decision is tactical is
unworkable.11 2 Court opinions, including those of the Supreme Court, that
emphasize the strategic or tactical element of the decision at issue fail to
distinguish among the different types of decisions. In one way or another,
all decisions involve tactical or strategic considerations."13

108.
Id.
109.
A public defender from Connecticut has summarized this concern in his blog as follows: "I'll
bet you a box of Krispy Kreme donuts this attorney, when seeing a copy of the motion raising this
claim, thought: 'oh crap, I never even thought of that!' And if you've practiced criminal law for longer
than a second, you've already run into some CYA lawyer who's told you to claim it was a tactical
decision, no matter what." See It 's not like you knew you had that right anyway, A PUB. DEFENDER
(Feb.
18, 2013), http://apubliedefender.com/2013/02/18/its-not-like-you-knew-you-had-that-rightanyway/.
110.
See Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing an argument that would place
defendant's decision to testify within counsel's control because it is a strategic or tactical decision);
U.S. v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11 th Cir. 1992) (if it were true that the mere fact that the decision on
whether defendant should testify involves strategy mandates that the decision rest with defense counsel
then the decision to waive a jury trial would logically also rest with the defense).
Ill.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 796 ("While the rights subject to defendant's 'personal
choice' clearly are 'fundamental.' the [U.S. Supreme] Court has not explained why various rights
subject to counsel's authority are not equally fundamental.... If the fundamental nature of a right is
measured by its importance, its historic tradition, or its current status in constitutional or state law,
[other] rights would appear to be on the same plane.").
112.
GILLERS, supra note 1, at 80 ("The ends/means distinction . . . has never proved truly
workable. For example, the decision whether a criminal accused will testify is, strictly speaking, a
decision about means toward the end of an acquittal, yet it is a decision for the accused."); see also
Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring) (the tactical vs. fundamental approach is vague and
derives from nothing more substantial than the Supreme Court's say-so).
113.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia agrees. In his concurring opinion in Gonzalez, he
stated: "What makes a right tactical? Depending on the circumstances, waiving any right can be a
tactical decision. Even pleading guilty, which waives the right to trial, is highly tactical, since it usually
requires balancing the prosecutor's plea bargain against the prospect of better and worse outcomes at
trial." Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at
796-97 ("In sum, just as the fundamental rights characterization could be applied to many of the rights
subject to counsel's control, so could the characterization of a decision as strategic and requiring
counsel's expertise be applied to certain basic determinations subject to defendant's control.").
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The end result of the analysis of the courts that have decided that an
attorney can waive the client's constitutional rights without consultation is
that, unless the case involves one of the decisions specifically mentioned in
the Rules or Restatement, a lawyer's authority to decide would always
control regardless of whether the decision would prejudice the client's
substantial rights, because the lawyer could always claim, or a court could
always find, that the decision was part of a tactical maneuver. Yet, it must
be presumed that the drafters of the Rules of Professional Conduct did not
intend to deprive a client of the chance to make decisions about a
fundamental right.'1 4 Otherwise, the underlying premise of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Restatement would be irrelevant. That would
not be a good result.
This undesirable result can and should be avoided by reading
"objectives" to include any decision affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing a client's rights.'" 5 In this way, a decision
involving a client's constitutional right has to be considered to be for the
client regardless of whether it can be considered to be tactical, unless it is a
decision that needs to be made "in the moment" and does not allow for a
reasonable opportunity for consultation, such as raising an objection in the
middle of a trial. Most issues that could affect a constitutional right,
however, will not fall into this category. Also, this would eliminate the
dubious distinction between mere constitutional rights and fundamental
constitutional rights."16
There is, on the other hand, an alternative solution to the problem,
proposed by Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurring
opinion in Gonzalez. His suggestion must be noted, and then rejected. In
short, his position is as follows:
. . . I would not adopt the tactical-vs-fundamental approach,
which is vague and derives from nothing more substantial than this
Court's say-so.

. .

. What makes a right tactical? Depending on the

circumstances, waiving any right can be a tactical decision. Even
pleading guilty, which waives the right to trial, is highly tactical,

114.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 12, at 67.

115.
Id. at 66.
As Justice Scalia has stated, "[a]part from constitutional guarantee, I know of no objective
116.
criterion for ranking rights." Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring) (one would think that
any right guaranteed by the Constitution would be fundamental); LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 12, at 796
("While the rights subject to defendant's 'personal choice' clearly are 'fundamental,' the [U.S.
Supreme] Court has not explained why various rights subject to counsel's authority are not equally
fundamental. . . . If the fundamental nature of a right is measured by its importance, its historic
tradition, or its current status in constitutional or state law, [other] rights would appear to be on the
same plane.").
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since it usually requires balancing the prosecutor's plea bargain
against the prospect of better and worse outcomes at trial.
Whether a right is "fundamental" is equally mysterious. One
would think that any right guaranteed by the Constitution would be
fundamental. . . . Apart from constitutional guarantee, I know of
no objective criterion for ranking rights. . . . The essence of

"fundamental" rights continues to elude.
I would therefore adopt the rule that, as a constitutional matter,
all waivable rights (except, of course, the right to counsel) can be
waived by counsel....
It may well be desirable to require a defendant's personal
waiver with regard to certain rights. Rule 11(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for example, provides that before
accepting a guilty plea the court must "address the defendant
personally in open court," advise him of the consequences of his
plea, and ensure that the plea is voluntary....
Even without such rules it is certainly prudent, to forestall later
challenges to counsel's conduct, for a trial court to satisfy itself of
the defendant's personal consent to certain actions, such as entry of
a guilty plea or waiver of jury trial, for which objective norms
require an attorney to seek his client's authorization. See, e.g.,
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (2007) ... But I
know of no basis for saying that the Constitution automatically
invalidates any trial action not taken by the defendant personally,
though taken by his authorized counsel. I know of no way of
determining, except by sheer prescription, which trial rights are ex
ante and by law subject to such a limitation upon waiver.
Assuredly the tactical-fundamental dichotomy does not do the
trick. I would leave this matter of placing reasonable limits upon
the right of agency in criminal trials to be governed by positive
law, in statutes and rules of procedure.' 17
Justice Scalia is correct in concluding that the distinctions between
ends and means, tactics and rights, and fundamental constitutional rights
and non-fundamental constitutional rights do not help determine which

117.

Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 256-58 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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rights can be waived by counsel without a client's consent."' 8 Having
concluded that, though, he suggests that the best approach would be to
adopt a rule that counsel can waive all waivable rights (except the right to
counsel) unless specific statutes or rules say otherwise." 9
There are several problems with this suggestion. First, Justice Scalia's
approach puts the emphasis back on the interpretation of rules of procedure
or professional conduct, which simply takes the discussion back to the
beginning and provides as little guidance as there was to begin with
because, as discussed above, the statutes and rules available are inadequate.
They don't provide a coherent analysis to help determine which rights
counsel can waive without consultation. Also, and more importantly,
Justice Scalia's approach would place defendants in danger of suffering the
consequences of the conduct of their lawyers who could waive all their
rights without consultation whatsoever.
It seems that Justice Scalia is concerned about holding that there is a
constitutional right to make certain decisions. Yet, that has never been
decided, nor was it the issue in Gonzalez. Also, Justice Scalia may be
thinking that the Court's ruling creates the basis for arguing that any time
an attorney makes a decision that belongs to the client, a court would have
to reverse the conviction because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Yet,
as discussed above, although the defendant could make the argument, that
would not necessarily be the result. In such cases, courts use a
"prosecution-friendly" standard that requires the defendant to prove that the
attorney's representation was inadequate and that the inadequate
representation resulted in prejudice, which is defined by a reasonable
probability that, but for the attorney's mistakes, the verdict may have been
different. 20
CONCLUSION

According to some courts, an attorney can waive a client's
constitutional right to a public trial without the client's consent if the
attorney does so as part of a tactical decision. Yet, the decision to waive a
public trial is no more tactical than the decision to waive a jury trial or to
In fact, Scalia suggested that any right guaranteed by the Constitution should be considered
118.
fundamental. Id. at 256.
119.
Id. at 257.
120.
See supra note 41. Justice Scalia's conclusion, however, is partially supported by the recently
decided case Littlejohn v. United States discussed supra in note 41. In that case, the court held that if
the defendant's right to a public trial has been violated and if the defendant's attorney's waiver of the
defendant's right was ineffective assistance of counsel, then the defendant would not have to show that
the attorney's conduct actually resulted in prejudice. The fact that prejudice would be presumed does
not relieve the defendant from the requirement to show the attorney's conduct was ineffective
assistance of counsel in the first place.
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have criminal defendants testify on their own behalf. In all three cases, the
decision affects the client's constitutional rights and, thus, the attorney
should not be allowed to decide for the client without consultation.
Rules and doctrines related to professional responsibility should be
based on the notion that attorneys should conduct their representation while
being mindful of, and with the aim to protect, the interests of their clients.
The analysis used by courts that hold that an attorney can make decisions
related to, and that can prejudice, their client's constitutional rights without
consent of their clients goes against this goal. In Lavoie, for example, the
lawyer and the court seem to have given some weight to the attorney's
concern that he did not want to interfere with the court officials. Thus, the
lawyer was allowed to place his personal interest over that of the client in
violation of the attorney's fiduciary duty.
Likewise, although Justice Scalia is correct in urging courts to
eliminate the dubious distinction between mere constitutional rights and
fundamental constitutional rights, because waiving a constitutional right
involves a decision that will affect the rights of clients and may affect the
merits of the cause or substantially prejudice a client's rights, the decision
should be considered to be for the client regardless of whether it can be
considered to be tactical, at least unless the decision is one of those rare
ones that absolutely needs to be made "in the moment" and that would be
too impractical to defer until after consultation with the client.
In deciding cases that ask the court to determine whether lawyers have
overstepped their authority to make decisions, courts should look to the
Restatement for guidance. It lists five criteria to help determine when an
attorney is required to defer to the client: (1) how important the decision is
for the client, (2) whether the client can reach an informed decision on
authorizing the lawyer, (3) whether reserving the decision to the client
would necessitate interrupting trials or constant consultations, (4) whether
reasonable persons would disagree about how the decision should be made,
and (5) whether the lawyer's interests may conflict with those of the
client.12 1 This approach will preserve the proper balance of allocation of
authority to make decisions within the attorney-client relationship and
protect the client's rights more effectively.
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